Caste, quotas and the Constitution: A call for rational reform
Amid growing calls for a caste census and proportional reservations, this editorial explores the historical roots, constitutional limits, and emerging challenges of India’s affirmative action framework.

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India's political discourse has been increasingly dominated by calls for a nationwide caste census, accompanied by demands to expand reservations in proportion to the population share of historically marginalised communities. The slogan Jitni Abadi Utni Hissedari' (representation proportional to population) has gained traction, with opposition leaders arguing that historically marginalised communities OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis-deserve representation matching their numerical strength, estimated at roughly 85% of India's population.
The roots of this debate trace back to the Mandal Commission (1979-80), which instituted the framework for OBC reservations using a rigorous set of 11 socio-educational indicators. Communities that scored at least 50% on the Commission's 22-point backwardness scale were identified as OBCs, estimated to constitute about 52% of India's population at that time. However, the Mandal Commission worked with limited data, relying on the 1931 Census-the last to collect caste-wise population figures-along with state categories and limited field surveys covering only about 1% of households. Crucially, the Commission recommended reviewing the entire scheme after twenty years, recognising that reservations were meant as instruments for social uplift rather than permanent entitlements. This built-in sunset clause emphasised the need for periodic reassessment to identify which groups had progressed and which still needed support. In the four decades since Mandal, India has undergone significant social and economic transformation. Some communities that were backward in 1980 have advanced considerably, while others not previously classified as 'backward' may now lag on various indices. Logically, the system should be dynamic, with communities being added or removed based on their changing status. In practice, however, once a group secures a place on the reservation list, it tends to remain there indefinitely.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Ashok Kumar Thakur vs Union of India (2008), questioning why no caste had ever been removed from OBC lists despite decades of reservations. The bench noted that while new castes were continually added, none were being excluded after achieving improved status. They reminded authorities of their duty to conduct periodic reviews rather than wait for external petitions. The implication was clear: if affirmative action is effective, some groups should graduate out of backwardness over time, creating space for those still disadvantaged. A contemporary caste census thus emerges as a compelling demand, capable of providing updated empirical evidence on social realities. It would clarify which groups still genuinely require affirmative action, thus recalibrating reservation policies based on current, rather than historical, data.
Further complicating the debate is the uneven distribution of reservation benefits among OBC communities, as highlighted by the recent Justice G Rohini Commission report (2023). This Commission, tasked with examining sub-categorisation of OBCs, found stark inequalities in quota distribution. According to newspaper reports, the committee found that a small number of populous or politically influential OBC communities have disproportionately captured reserved opportunities, leaving smaller or weaker communities marginalised. The Rohini Commission recommended subdividing the existing 27% OBC quota to ensure equitable benefit-sharing, recognising that treating all OBCs uniformly exacerbates inequalities rather than alleviating them. This echoed concerns raised even during the Mandal Commission, where one member, LR Naik, advocated splitting OBCs into 'Intermediate' and 'Depressed' categories with separate allocations.
The recent Bihar caste survey of 2023 further amplified the political intensity of the debate. It revealed that OBCs (27.1%) and Extremely Backward Classes (36%) together constitute about 63% of Bihar's population. When combined with Scheduled Castes (19.7%) and Scheduled Tribes (1.7%), disadvantaged groups reach approximately 85% of the state's population. The Bihar government responded by attempting to increase reservation limits from 50% to 65%. Such findings strengthen the perception nationwide that reservation quotas should more closely reflect demographic realities.
However, translating these demographics into policy faces constitutional constraints. Article 16(4) permits reservations for backward classes only if they are "not adequately represented" in public services. The criterion is inadequate representation, not population percentage. The landmark Indra Sawhney vs Union of India (1992) judgment upheld OBC reservations but imposed a 50% cap on total quotas, reasoning that reservations are exceptions to the equality principle and must be balanced against merit-based competition. Although exceptions like Tamil Nadu's 69% reservation or the recent Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) quota challenge this limit, nationwide reservation expansion to 85% would likely require significant constitutional amendments or judicial reinterpretations, neither straightforward nor guaranteed.
Beyond legal hurdles, proportional reservation raises practical and philosophical questions. If every community were allocated positions exactly matching its population share, the competitive examination system would be fundamentally altered - essentially creating separate competitions within each community. This approach leans more towards consociation power-sharing than individual merit. Constitutionally, such extensive compartmentalisation might violate Article 14's equality provisions and potentially entrench rather than reduce caste divisions.
An 85% reservation system would also generate significant social friction. The remaining 15% in the general category would perceive themselves as marginalised, while competition for sub-quotas within the 85% would intensify as OBCs, SCs and STs each demanded their "fair share." The constitutional vision of India eventually becoming a casteless society-where affirmative action serves as a temporary measure could be compromised by a rigid, population-proportional system without periodic review.
Nevertheless, conducting a comprehensive caste census remains valuable. It would update the empirical foundation of India's social justice policies, currently based on outdated information. With precise population and socio-economic data for each caste, the reservation system could be fine-tuned: some groups might merit larger shares or separate quotas if they are populous but underrepresented, while others might be transitioned out after achieving adequate advancement. New disadvantaged groups, perhaps not identified in 1980, might warrant inclusion.
Ultimately, the goal should be data-driven policy that balances proportional representation with the constitutional framework and the original purpose of reservations: to create a more equitable society where such measures eventually become unnecessary. A caste census followed by informed deliberation could finally implement the periodic, evidence-based revision that the Mandal Commission envisioned decades ago.